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Inclusivity and equality in the quest for transformation in employment opportunities. 
 
1.2 The Purpose of the Research 
The purpose of this research is to bridge the tension between the two voices diverging in 
society. It follows that this research intends to investigate the possibility of having an 
interpretation of affirmative action that is inclusive and at the same time providing equal 
opportunities for all. Moreover, the research aims to investigate whether affirmative action is 
working and whether South Africa should continue with it. To achieve what this research 
intends to do, it will look at the history of affirmative action and the reasons why it was created. 
Furthermore, the research will look at the arguments for and against affirmative action. The 
purpose of this research is to try and manage the tension between the racial nature and racial 
exclusivism of affirmative action and also to meet the Constitutional1 requirement of equal 
opportunities for all.  
As mentioned above the main issues to be investigated in this study will be whether the tension 
between the racial nature and racial exclusivism of affirmative action and the requirement for 
equal opportunities for all can be managed. Apartheid laws favoured white people, this has 
resulted in the crisis of a major gap in employment opportunities as white people still occupy 
top key positions.2 Policies and legislation implemented to try and bridge that gap seem not to 
have achieved that goal3. The intention is not to have a situation where the coin is flipped, and 
South Africa finds itself in a position where the majority of black South Africans occupy all 
the top positions and have the white minorities jobless. However, this research imagines a 
situation where, as required by the legislation and policies, and the Constitution, equal 
                                                          
1 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
2 Sapa “Most top managers still whites – report” available at http://www.fin24.com/Economy/Whites-still-top-
management-posts-report-20140409-2 , accessed on 25 August 2017. 
3  Hermann D “The current position of affirmative action” available at https://navorsing.solidariteit.co.za/the-
current-position-of-affirmative-action/ , accessed on 25 August 2017. 
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opportunities are made available to all and at the same time have no sense of oppression 
directed towards white minorities. 
 
1.3 Methodology 
This is a desktop study and the literature will be based on primary and secondary data. Various 
sources will be utilized in writing this dissertation. Relevant South African and international 
sources will be used; including primary sources i.e. Bills, Statutes and secondary sources i.e. 
Books, Journal Articles and Conference papers (local and international), Policy Documents 
and recommendations, South African and international law reports. As a result of this 
methodology being desktop, SAFLI, Sabinet, Google Scholar, Juta, HeinOnline and other 
online database have been used. The research data will mostly come from legislation and case 
law available on the issue of the interpretation of South African affirmative action, and in-depth 
perspectives will be covered by literature in journal articles and other legal writings. 
 
1.4 Background 
Black people are the majority in South Africa4. Post-apartheid South Africa finds itself in a 
place where it has to manage two complex processes. On one hand the Constitution calls for 
inclusivity, due to unjust laws of apartheid and on the other hand the same Constitution calls 
for equal opportunities. Two sides are diverging, on one hand the ‘black’ majority are calling 
for speeding up the process of transformation in employment opportunities, holding the view 
that it is too slow5 and on the other hand ‘white’ minorities are of the view that the call for 
transformation and implemented policies is reversed racism6. Statistics from reliable sources 
have shown that white minorities still occupy top or managerial positions, this in itself is a 
concern.7 When President Cyril Ramaphosa  addresed the State of the Nation Address he 
                                                          
4 Brand South Africa “South Africa’s population” available at https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/people-
culture/people/south-africas-population , accessed on 25 August 2017. 
5 Khoabane P “Radical Economic Transformation not a re-invention of the wheel but speeding-up existing 
programmes” https://uncensoredopinion.co.za/radical-economic-transformation-not-re-invention-wheel-
speeding-existing-strategies/ , accessed on 25 August 2017. 
6 Gumede M “What is the reverse discrimination like in South Africa?” available at 
https://www.quora.com/What-is-the-reverse-discrimination-like-in-South-Africa , accessed on 25 August 
2017. 
7 The 17th Annual Commission for Employment Equity Report Available at: 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/documents/annual-
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highlighted  that  says ‘data indicated that young white people still do better than their black 
peers in social development indicators’.8 In addition, a major concern is that women are not 
employed in key positions. Furthermore, statistics show that women are sitting way below the 
number of top positions they should be occupying.9  
The study shows that the implementation of affirmative action in South Africa seems to have 
not reached the goals to which it was intended for. Literature shows that the issue of affirmative 
action and employment opportunities for all is an area of research that is widely debated.10  
Reasons being the unavoidable debate of racism and reversed racism that seems to always be 
at the centre of the diversity within South Africa. Commentators highlight that race is at the 
core of this debated issue, as it is said that one cannot talk about affirmative action and 
employment opportunities for all and leave out the issue of race given the historical background 
of this country. Few studies conducted in developing countries reveal that the presence of the 
legal provision for affirmative action does not guarantee that opportunities will be available to 
people who according to legislation like the Employment Equity Act11, ought to have jobs or 
employment with the intention of addressing the imbalances created by the past governing 
bodies. Instead further implementation mechanisms are said to be needed.  
The Labour Relations Act12, The Basic Conditions of Employment Act13, Promotion of 
Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act14, Employment Equity Act and all other 
labour and transformative statutes give effect to the principles of the Constitution. Given the 
superiority of the Constitution, most of the legislation dealing with the issues of transformation 
and addressing inequalities arise from the Constitution itself. This research focusses more on 
the Constitution and the EEA15.  The main purpose of the EEA is to provide for employment 
equity through measures like affirmative action which will redress the imbalances of the past. 
                                                          
reports/Commission%20for%20Employment%20Equity%20Report/2016-2017/commission-for-employment-
equity-report-2016-2017 Accessed on 08 March 2018. 
8 Zulu M  “It is not true that young white people are disadvantaged – Ramaphosa” available at: 
https://citizen.co.za/news/1827739/it-is-not-true-that-young-white-people-are-disadvantaged/ accessed on 
08 March 2018. 
9 Van Wyk A “Are 37.5% of jobless young S. Africans black women, and 31.5% white men?” available at 
https://africacheck.org/reports/do-black-women-make-up-37-5-of-unemployed-south-africans-aged-15-34/ , 
accessed on 25 August 2017. 
10 Debatepedia “Is affirmative action good public policy?” available at:  
http://debatepedia.idebate.org/en/index.php/Debate:_Affirmative_action accessed on 19 October 2017. 
11 Act 55 of 1998. 
12 Act 66 of 1995. 
13 Act 75 of 1997. 
14 Act 4 of 2000. 
15 Note 8 above.  
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This Act seeks to bring an end to decades of inequalities that are as a result of both apartheid 
policies and societal prejudices and stereotypes. The EEA seeks to ensure that the people of 
South Africa enjoy equality of opportunities in employment that were hitherto denied to them.  
The mandate given by EEA and the Constitution has attracted different reactions in our country. 
Statistics have shown that there has not been much change in employment opportunities 
considering that South Africa’s population is dominated by black people.16 However, that 
seems not to be the case in top positions as research has shown that the white people still occupy 
the very position that they occupied during the apartheid era.17 For example the BMF18 report 
shows that BMF continues to keep Corporate South Africa’s transformation record in check by 
advocating for the appointment of black professionals to meaningful positions within 
companies. The statistic provided by the BMF report shows how far behind black people are 
when it comes to the occupation of top managerial positions in which itself is proof that black 
people have lesser employment opportunities than white people. The reports are a reflection of 
the fact that when Apatheid laws were removed there was no automatic equal society that was 
created. The Jack Hammer Executive Report19 which was released in 2015, revealed that the 
proportion of CEOs who are black South African has fallen from 15% in 2012 to 10% in 2015. 
The study of this report will answer some of the questions from this research. The study has 
also shown that women are still not employed in top positions. This study not only focuses on 
the private sector but also the public sector. Oppenheimer’s research reveal that some women 
and black staff feel that their contributions are not always valued and that career and 
professional development plans for them are non-existent. 20 Another view is that ‘black’ 
people are forced to carry the stigma of having been appointed to meet a racial quota.21 
Moreover the study provides this research with statistics, such as, for example; nationally in 
2007, 62.6 per cent of all students (476 770) in the public higher education system were Black 
African, 23.7 per cent (180 461) were White, 6.9 per cent (52 596) were Indian/Asian, and 6.4 
                                                          
16 Brand South Africa “South Africa’s Population” available at: https://www.brandsouthafrica.com/people-
culture/people/south-africas-population accessed 20 October 2017. 
17 Sesant S “Affirmative Action isn't going anywhere, says minister” 
 https://www.iol.co.za/capeargus/affirmative-action-isnt-going-anywhere-says-minister-9053610 accessed 20 
October 2017. 
18 Black Management Forum 40 Years of changing the Transformation Landscape Annual Report (2016).  
19 Jack Hammer Executive Report available at: http://www.jhammer.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/JackHammer-ER3.pdf accessed 20 October 2017. 
20 Oppenheimer, M and Kok, C ‘Non-Racial Affirmative Action in Employment’ 2014 16 South African Institution 
of Race Relations available at http://irr.org.za/reports-and-publications/atLiberty/files/irr-liberty-non-racial-
affirmative-action-november-2014-16.pdf, accessed on 25 February 2017. 
21 Ibid. 
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per cent (49 066) were Coloured22. The 2007 University intake statistic will help this research 
assess the progress of transformation in 2017 which is 10 years later. Statistics from the BMF 
report show that white people are still holding on to key positions after 23 years of democracy. 
As a result, the enjoyment of the new era seems to be only limited to the hands that enjoyed 
the old era (Apartheid).  Reversed racism is said to be used as a shield by white people when 
the black majority call for speeding up of the transformation. Deane’s research reveal that some 
people whole heartedly believe that the principles of affirmative action are reversed racism. 
Responding commentators argue that there is nothing in section 15 of the EEA that establishes 
an absolute barrier to people who are not from designated groups.23 According to the EEA, 
‘Designated Groups’ refer to the following people: Black people (in other words, Africans, 
coloureds or Indians), women, and people with disabilities.24 Chinese people are also 
considered members of the ‘designated group’. It is important to highlight that there are actual 
differences in disadvantages of the members within the identified ‘designated group’. This 
means that although they (black women, white women, black men, disabled people and the rest 
of the members) all form part of the members of  ‘designated groups’, their struggles are not 
the same and as a result their recruitment to employment opportunities will not be the same as 
some will be preferred over the others, depending on circumstances. 
The study then shows, after evaluation of the two diverting views above, the issue of merits 
that come into play. With some commentators holding the view that race is not an accurate 
proxy for disadvantage.25 The question whether or not in employment opportunities merits 
should be taken into account is posed, with some views for, and some against the inclusion of 
merits. There are also conflicting views, ones for, and the other against. However, the latter 
seems to be correct. Bodenner argues that affirmative action, logically, should be a temporary 
measure and that it could be argued that if affirmative action were to continue indefinitely its 
results could have negative economic and social consequences holding the view that once 
substantive equality has been attained, the affirmative action policy should end.26 The EEA and 
the Constitution has called for equal employment opportunities for all, as a result our 
                                                          
22 Van Wyk B ‘the Affirmative Action Debate: A Critical Reflection’ (2010) 24 SAJHE 358 366.  
23 Deane T ‘The Regulation of Affirmative Action in the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998’ (2006) 18 SAMJ 
381 388.  
24 Section 1 of the EEA. 
25 Nconco M “substantive equality and affirmative action in the workplace” LLM, Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University, 2012 
26 Bodenner C “The End of Affirmative Action?” Available at: 
https://www.theatlantic.com/notes/all/2015/12/the-end-of-affirmative-action/420042/ Accessed 27 August 
2017. 
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interpretation of affirmative action should reflect on the mandate of the legislature. The 
research will also look at the recent Constitutional judgements of South African Police Service 
v Solidarity obo Barnard27 and Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services 
and Others28, focussing on how this cases impacted the application of affirmative action 
measures in the country. Other cases will be looked at as well, including the first case which 
directly dealt with affirmative action the Minister of Finance and Another v Van Heerden’s29 
case. 
As noted above, it cannot be that black people in South Africa are a majority and South Africa 
having achieved democracy 23 years ago, still face the same issues of inequalities in 
employment opportunities. As statistics show that white people are still holding on to the key 
positions, which they enjoyed during the apartheid time30. It is therefore a concern that, having 
all the policies and legislation in place which are trying to rectify the issue of inequalities in 
employment opportunities, yet the country has not achieved the goal of equal opportunities for 
all after 23 years. This study is worth doing because the focus of the study is to assess whether 
or not there is a need to continue with the policies and legislation that was passed to address 
this issue of inequality, and at the same time look at other jurisdictional policies and legislation 
that have achieved the goals which were meant to be achieved. This research will help in 
changing the practices of such as: ‘men occupying the top positions’ especially in government. 
Moreover, the intention of the study is to provide transformation in employment opportunities, 
whilst avoiding reversed racism. The study will also help in assessing the issues of merits when 
it comes to employment opportunities, and provide a clear guide as to how merits are balanced 
against the basic principles of affirmative action. The study aims to achieve an interpretation 
of affirmative action that is inclusive, and that provides equality and transformation in 
employment opportunities. 
 
1.5 Sequence of Chapters 
This dissertation contains five chapters. The first chapter sets out the introduction which 
includes the intended aim, methodology, purpose and background of this dissertation.  
                                                          
27 [2014] 11 BLLR 1025 (CC). 
28 2016 (5) SA 594 (CC). 
29 Minister of Finance and another vs Van Heerden 2004 (12) BLLR 1181(CC). 
30 Note 17 above. 
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The second chapter defines affirmative action. This chapter will look at affirmative action in a 
South African context, the notion of equality and the South African approach will be discussed 
and lastly it will look at the legislative requirement for equal employment opportunities.  
The third chapter looks at how the racial nature of affirmative action can be managed whilst 
meeting the requirement for equal employment opportunities for all and discusses arguments 
for and against affirmative action. This chapter seeks to examine the question of whether the 
tension between inclusivity and equal opportunity can be bridged in our interpretation of 
affirmative action. 
The fourth chapter looks at the current legal position regarding affirmative action and how it is 
applied in South Africa. In order to do this, the South African Police Service v Solidarity obo 
Barnard31 and Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others32 and 
other current and relevant cases are discussed and analyzed. The Barnard’s case is used in this 
analysis because it the current leading case in issues involving the application of affirmative 
action. 
The final chapter contains the conclusion to the dissertation. This chapter answers the question 
of: How South Africa can continue with affirmative action that is not inclusive but at the same 










                                                          
31 Note 27 above. 
32 Note 28 above. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is a discussion on affirmative action.  It is therefore important to firstly give a 
clear understanding of the concept and the principles that underpin it. It introduces and defines 
affirmative action, and discusses the different types of equality attached to affirmative action.  
Moreover it looks at the brief history of affirmative action. As stated in the previous chapter, 
this chapter will look at how the racial nature of affirmative action can be managed whilst 
meeting the requirement for equal employment opportunities for all. 
 
2.2 The South African Context 
The major changes in the South African workplace towards attaining equality began in July 
1977 when a commission chaired by Professor NE Wiehahn was established.33 The 
establishment of the commission was aimed at solely addressing the ‘changing needs of time’ 
and for this reason it investigated the labour dispensation.34 The reason for transformation was 
expressed as follows:  
‘It took as points of departure the use of the labour field in South Africa as the conflict 
area for the acquisition of social, political and other rights for the workers of the country 
and the fact that changes in labour laws would have a ripple effect on other spheres of 
society. It viewed change over a broader front in society as essential’35 
As a result, preferences of absolute attributes of race, gender, and colour were established and 
influenced the granting of more favourable terms and conditions of employment and 
promotions.36 The 1980s saw the first step towards promoting such practices, though in a 
limited ad hoc manner. Discrimination on the basis of race, gender and colour in industrial 
council agreements was outlawed in 1981.37  
                                                          




37 By amendments s 24(2) of the Labour Relations Act 28 of 1856 and by Wages Act 5 of 1957. 
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South Africa is made up of one of the most diverse societies. To mention a few, South Africa 
has 11 official languages, different ethnic groups, races, religion and cultures. The unjust laws 
governing the country during the apartheid era were designed to create disadvantages among 
races and gender. African, Coloured and Indian people had limited access to amenities, this 
included getting different education and less employment opportunities under the apartheid 
regime. The democratic era is represented by the progressive South African Constitution which 
is founded on defined values of “human dignity, the achievement of equality and the 
advancement of human rights and freedom”38. What distinguishes the South African 
Constitution from other Constitutions is that it acknowledges the injustices perpetuated against 
certain classes of people and necessitated restorative measures be put in place to redress the 
disadvantages those classes of people suffered.39 
 
2.3 Definition of Affirmative Action 
A universal definition of affirmative action does not exist.40 The term ‘affirmative action’ was 
firstly introduced in the United States in 1961 by the executive order 1092541 of U.S President 
J.F Kennedy.42 The concept of affirmative action develops over time and adapts to the change 
of time. The definition and implementation of affirmative action differs due to the differences 
in culture and political structure of countries using it.43 
According to Tomei44 ‘Affirmative action means the deliberate use of race- or gender-
conscious criteria for the specific purpose of benefiting a group which has previously been 
disadvantaged on grounds of race or gender. Its aim ranges from providing a specific remedy 
for invidious discrimination to the more general purpose of increasing the participation of 
groups which are visibly under-represented in important public spheres such as education, 
politics or employment.’45 
                                                          
38 Section 1 (a) of the South Africa Constitution, 1996. 
39 Ibid, Section 9 (2). 
40 Elaine Kennedy-Dubourdieu (ed), Race and Inequality: World Perspective on Affirmative Action (Ashgate 
Publishing, 2006) 173. 
41 Executive Order 10925 (EO 10925) s 301 (1) prohibits discrimination in government contracting on basis on 
‘race, creed, colour or national origin’. 
42 Terry H Anderson, The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action (Oxford University Press, 2004) 60. 
43 Matthew J Lindsay, ‘How Anti-Discrimination Law Learned to Live with Racial Inequalities’ (2006) 75 
University of Cincinnati Law Review 93-5. 
44 Ms Manuela Tomei is the Director of the International Labour Organization’s Conditions of Work and 
Employment Programme. 
45 M Tomei ‘Discrimination and equality at work: A review of concepts’ (2003) 142: 4 International 
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Faundez46, states that ‘affirmative action involves treating a sub-class or a group of people 
differently in order to improve their chances of obtaining a particular good or to ensure that 
they obtain a proportion of certain goods’47, Smith48 states that ‘affirmative action is 
preferential access to social resources for persons who are members of groups which have been 
previously disadvantaged by adverse discrimination’.49 
According to Anderson50 ‘affirmative action is referred to as any policy that aims to increase 
the participation of a disadvantaged social group in mainstream institutions, either through 
“outreach” (targeting the group for publicity and invitations to participate) or “preference” 
(using group membership, or proxies, as criteria for selecting participants in the opportunity).’51 
Fredman52 also states that ‘affirmative action denotes the deliberate use of race- or gender-
conscious criteria for the specific purpose of benefiting a group which has previously been 
disadvantaged on grounds of race or gender. Its aims range from providing a specific remedy 
for invidious discrimination to the more general purpose of increasing the participation of 
groups which are visibly under-represented in important public spheres such as education, 
politics or employment.’53 
Section 15 (1) of the EEA defines affirmative action as: 
“Measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified people from designated groups 
have equal opportunities and are equitably represented across all occupational 
categories and levels in the workforce of a designated employer”. 
It is clear from this definition that the intention of the legislature was to give a purposive 
meaning to affirmative action. The concept of affirmative action is goal oriented. The 
Constitution and the EEA are the legal instruments which affirmative action roots its purpose. 
The Constitution provides that:  
                                                          
Labour Review 401 at 407. 
46 Julio Faundez Is a Professor of Law at University of Warwick Coventry, United Kingdom. 
47 J Faundez Affirmative action international perspectives 1 (ed) (1994) at 34. 
48 Louise N. Smith is an attorney in the United States of America and represents clients in a wide range of 
employment and business law matters, including class and collective action litigation. 
49 N Smith “Affirmative action under the new Constitution” 1995 SAJHR 84 at 234. 
50 Elizabeth Anderson is a University Professor and teaches courses in ethics, social and political philosophy, 
political economy, philosophy of the social sciences, and feminist theory. 
51 E Anderson The Imperitive integration (2010) at 135. 
52 Sandra Fredman is Rhodes Professor of the Laws of the British Commonwealth and the USA at Oxford 
University.  
53 S Fredman “Reversing discrimination” (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 575 at 576. 
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“Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote 
the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or 
advance persons or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may 
be taken”.54 
This Constitutional provision can be interpreted to mean that the people prejudiced by 
discrimination (persons from designated groups) are to be uplifted by affirmative action. The 
nature of affirmative action is designed to ensure that steps to correct the imbalances in social 
standings between people from different groups fully enjoy their rights and freedoms. To put 
emphasis on the point made above, Moseneke J in Minister of Finance and another vs Van 
Heerden55 laid a test to determine whether affirmative action measures target persons or 
categories of persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination is Constitutional. 
The test is: 
“…to determine whether a measure falls within section 9(2) the enquiry is threefold.  
The first yardstick relates to whether the measure targets persons or categories of 
persons who have been disadvantaged by unfair discrimination; the second is whether 
the measure is designed to protect or advance such persons or categories of persons; 
and the third requirement is whether the measure promotes the achievement of 
equality”.56 
The wording of the affirmative action provision in the EEA seems to pass this Constitutional 
test, as the first requirement has been addressed under the heading “designated group” and also 
the second and the third requirements addressed in the Act. 
 
2.4 The Notion of Equality and the South African Approach 
Explanation of the concept of formal equality and substantive equality and also equality of 
opportunities will be discussed below.  
2.4.1 Formal Equality 
                                                          
54 Section 9(2). 
55 Note 28 above, para 37. 
56 Ibid. 
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Affirmative action is viewed as reverse discrimination in this perspective.57 Formal equality 
views the use of race, gender or disability as discriminatory, even in circumstances where it is 
used to classify individuals in need of compensation.58 Formal equality is procedural in nature 
and has no remedial intent at all.59 All members of society are deemed to be equal bearers of 
rights. Society could rid itself from inequality by extending the same rights and privileges to 
all in a neutral manner by not discriminating between socioeconomic differences between 
groups. This is also known as a proportioned view of equality. This idea contends that it is in 
order for a disadvantaged group to contest affirmative action as a violation of the principle of 
equality.60 This model favours individual rights instead of group rights61. With this model, 
cases are not dealt with on their own merits but are treated alike and does not identify instances 
when it is justified to treat unequal cases differently.62 The principle of individual merit, over 
group status is also favoured and merit is viewed as a function of disadvantage rather than an 
objective characteristic.63 With this approach, the state acts as a neutral force between its 
citizens, favouring no one above any other. 
However this approach has its own shortcomings. This approach does not consider social 
context and circumstances as it favours equal treatment. Unfortunately equal treatment could 
perpetuate and even exacerbate existing inequalities.64 ‘Equality is also viewed as a relative 
concept under the notion of formal equality, which means that it could be attained by treating 
everyone equally bad or by removing benefits to bring all in line with the worse-off”.65 The 
existence of systematic and structural inequalities in societies is ignored by this approach as 
formal equality fails to recognise deeply entrenched patterns of rooted disadvantaged groups.66 
This could be positive in the sense that it prevents those distinctions on the basis of status 
                                                          
57 S Fredman ‘Reversing discrimination’ (1997) 113 Law Quarterly Review 575 at 576. 
58 S Fredman ‘Providing equality: substantive equality and the positive duty to provide’ (2005) 21 SAJHR 
163 at164. 
59 M Fineman ‘Equality across legal cultures: the role for international human rights’ (2004) 27 Thomas 
Jefferson Law Review 1 at 2. 
60 C Albertyn et al ‘Substantive equality, social rights and women: a comparative perspective’ (2007) 23 
SAJHR 209 at 209. 
61 S Fredman ‘Redistribution and recognition: reconciling inequalities’ (2007) 23 SAJHR 214 at 233. 
62 J Faundez Affirmative action international perspectives 1 (ed) (1994) at 3. 
63 S Fredman ‘Facing the future: Substantive equality under spotlight’ in O Dupper & C Garbers ‘Equality in the 
workplace reflections of South Africa and beyond’ 1 (ed) (2009) at 16. 
64 Note 46 above, at 163. 
65 Note 51 above. 
66 C Cooper ‘The boundaries of equality in labour law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 813 at 817. 
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affiliations, such as race and gender. A situation where formal equality application could be 
useful is in situations where equal pay for equal work is challenged.67 
2.4.2 Substantive Equality 
On the other hand, substantive equality was developed from the failings of formal equality. 
Albertyn views substantive equality as having four characteristics namely concern with impact 
of a measure on society, acceptance of difference, purposive and value based approach to rights 
to achieve equality.68 Substantive equality can be approached in four different ways, namely 
“equality of results, equal opportunities; substantive rights and a broad value driven 
approach”.69 
Equality of results was conceived out of the realization that identical treatment does not result 
in equal positions.70 In other words, anti-discrimination laws are not sufficient to achieve the 
transformational goal as envisaged in the Constitution and EEA. On the other hand, equality 
of opportunities is an acknowledgement of the fact that persons of different social groups are 
positioned differently and cannot compete equally.71 This contextual approach to equality is 
the symbol of substantive equality as it takes into account the effect of history on people’s 
capacities.72 It therefore makes it essential that proactive measures be taken to counter the effect 
of historical factors on the realization of full human potential. Such action is allowed to the 
extent that it corrects the inequality of those being compared.73 
The purpose of substantive equality is to eradicate socio-economic inequalities and the 
structures that cause them. Social inequality refers to situations where exclusion from a benefit 
is based on a person’s social identity whereas economic inequality refers to “unequal access 
to, and distribution of, basic needs, opportunities and material resources”.74  
Under-representation in the workplace is a manifestation of economic inequality in 
employment law. Such underrepresentation means that there is an uneven dispersal of resources 
such as employment opportunities. It therefore is important to have legislation such as the EEA 
                                                          
67 M Fineman ‘Equality across legal cultures: the role for international human rights’ (2004) 27 Thomas 
Jefferson Law Review 1 at 2. 
68 C Albertyn “Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa” (2007) 23 SAJHR 253, 258.   
69 C Barnard and B Hepple “Substantive Equality” (2000) 59 Cambridge Law Journal 562, 564.   
70 Mhungu V Positive Discrimination in South African Employment Law: Has Affirmative Action Overstayed its 




74 Note 60 above at 255. 
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that will have measures taken to redistribute such resources. However, this does not mean that 
differences should be eliminated. Substantive equality requires the removal of difference which 
is tied to disadvantage.75 Thus if being underrepresented in the workforce means unequal 
access to economic benefits of being in a job, such a scenario needs to be rectified. This, 
however, needs to be done in accordance with the Constitution.76 Both individual worth and 
dignity are recognised by substantive equality. Primarily, substantive equality stresses that the 
interpretation of rights should take into account both the context in which violation of rights 
takes place and the purpose for which the right was created.77 This nuanced approach ensures 
that measures taken and decisions made remain in line with the precepts of the Constitution.78 
2.4.3 Equality of Opportunities 
Equality of opportunity is a mixture of the two approaches, formal and substantive equality, 
using arguments from both, to allow positive action with strict limits.79 For this approach, the 
consideration of distributive factors is crucial for the attainment of equality.80 For equality to 
be achieved in terms of this approach, role players cannot start the race at different starting 
points and cannot depart from the principle of individualism.81 This approach disregards 
historical factors impacting negatively on an individual’s life chances.82 
In terms of this approach, when the starting point is equal, individualism will reassert itself 
when the point of neutrality and symmetry is reached. To be more specific, this notion 
acknowledges that the individual’s opportunities are influenced by structural discrimination 
based on group characteristics as a result this notion is in favour of preferential treatment based 
on race, gender and even disability, until the purpose of equalising the starting point is met. A 
strong dependence is also placed on merit, which is detrimental in our understanding of 
disadvantage.83 The institutional discrimination issue can be said to have been resolved when 
                                                          
75 Ibid, at 260. 
76 Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others 2004 (4) SA490 (CC) 
para 76.   
77 Note 60 above, at 260. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Charles S A Critique of the Concept of Disadvantage in relation to the Identification of Affirmative Action 
Beneficiaries: Race as Proxy for Disadvantage (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of Cape Town, 2013) 21. 
80 Note 45 above at 576-579. 
81 S Medjuck ‘Taking Equality into the 21st Century: Commentary’ (2001) 12 National Journal of 
Constitutional Law 49 at 49-50; Equal Rights Trust „The Ideas of Equality and Non-Discrimination: Formal and 
Substantive Equality‟ at 3. Available at 
http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/The%20Ideas%20of%20Equality%20and%20Nondiscri 
mination,%20Formal%20and%20Substantive%20Equality.pdf [Accessed 26 June 2012]. 
82 Note 70 above. 
83 Ibid. 
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individuals enjoy equality of opportunities and get to be treated on the basis of their qualities 
and not on race or other status-based criteria.84 For individuals to compete on a fair footing, 
human rights will allow for individuals with lesser qualifications belonging to a certain group, 
to receive preferential treatment for employment and this would be in line with the fair play 
principle. 85 Removing obstacles in the recruitment process would be a practical application of 
this approach. However, the problem with this approach is that it does not guarantee that the 
disadvantaged groups would be in a position to take advantage of the available opportunities.86 
For example, when man and woman with the same qualifications compete for an employment 
opportunity, the woman ought to be favoured if they are underrepresented at this grade. This 
policy would be a temporary measure and once the goal of woman’s representivity has been 
reached, the individual merit principle would be the determining factor.87 This model can be 
criticised on the basis that it is merely procedural and the outcomes are not necessarily 
guaranteed.88 By increasing the requirements for an entry level job would still exclude poorly 
qualified black employees, posing barriers to the employment of these employees.89 “This 
model is applied in the European Union countries, where specific measures are in place to 
ensure positive action, preventing current and compensate for past discrimination, as well as 
promoting equality”.90 
2.4.4 The South African Approach 
The South African Constitution prescribes to the substantive notion of equality.91 Monseneke 
J in the van Heerden92 case explained what substantive equality should mean in the South 
African context. The following was held: 
“This substantive notion of equality recognizes that besides uneven race, class and 
gender attributes of our society, there are other levels and forms of social differentiation 
                                                          
84 Note 45 above, at 579. 
85 Note 69 above, at 51. 
86 Note 50 above, at 167. 
87 O Dupper ‘Affirmative Action and Substantive Equality: The South African Experience’ 2002 SAMLJ 
275 at 279. 
88 J Waldron in S Guest and A Milne Equality and Discrimination (1985) at 97. 
89 Note 50 above, at 580. 
90 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000, (the Employment Directive), Article 7. http://eurlex. 
europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32000L0078:EN:HTML [Accessed 13 July 2012]. 
102 Case C-450/93 Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen [1995] E.C.R. I-3051; [1996] I.C.R. 314 (E.C.J). 
91 Equal Rights Trust “The Ideas of Equality and Non-Discrimination: Formal and Substantive Equality” Available 
at: http://www.equalrightstrust.org/ertdocumentbank/The%20Ideas%20of%20Equality%20and%20Nondiscri 
mination,%20Formal%20and%20Substantive%20Equality.pdf [Accessed 13 July 2012]. 
92 Note 28 above. 
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and systematic under-privilege, which still persist. The Constitution enjoins us to 
dismantle them and to prevent the creation of new patterns of disadvantage. It is 
therefore incumbent on courts to scrutinize in each equality claim the situation of the 
complainants in society; their history and vulnerability; the history, nature and purpose 
of the discriminatory practice and whether it ameliorates or adds to group disadvantages 
in real life context, in order to determine its fairness or otherwise in the light of the 
values of our Constitution. In the assessment of fairness or otherwise a flexible but 
'situation-sensitive' approach is indispensable, because of shifting patterns of hurtful 
discrimination and stereotypical response in our evolving democratic society”93 
 
The above acknowledgement of contextual factors refers to the transformative role which 
substantive equality could and should play in bringing about equality, by rooting out systemic 
inequality.94 This approach uses the individual status of race as the dominant norm of 
disadvantage but does not attempt to disregard group differences. Fredman holds the view that 
substantive equality does not disregard the categorisation by race or gender or on status 
grounds, but actions to find supplemental criteria to identify who should benefit from redress 
measures.95 The government has a positive duty to intervene and eradicate discrimination, and 
because of this reason government cannot take a neutral position, for such a stance will be 
regarded as support to societal discrimination. The results of this measure will ultimately bring 
about a more egalitarian society.96  
In South Africa, the focus is on groups to receive redress for the legacy of systemic 
discrimination they suffered under apartheid. Institutionalised racial discrimination was the 
order of the day prior to 1994. In as much as there is a strong support for this approach, this is 
not easy in the South African context as in many instances, race still acts as the identifying 
criteria for disadvantage. Put differently, it acts as a proxy for disadvantage and is the main 
reason for conflict between the beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries.97 
 
                                                          
93 Ibid, para 27. 
94 Note 70 above, at 24. 
95 Note 46 above. 
96 Note 49 above.  
97 Note 67 above. 
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2.5 The Legislative Requirement for Equal Employment Opportunities 
The Employment Equity Act as the name of the Act suggest, gives effect to the Constitutional 
requirement which provides that equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms.98 The EEA has as a result provided for representivity. The specific sections in 
the EEA that provide for representivity are sections 2, 15 and 42. The principle of representivity 
in South Africa is generally considered to be important for social order.99 The Constitution 
itself calls for representivity.100 Above all, the primary tool for representivity and 
transformation can be seen from the provisions of the EEA.101 The provisions will be discussed 
below. 
2.5.1 Section 2 of the EEA 
The EEA’s purpose is to achieve employment equity in the labour market by:  
a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and  
b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in 
employment experienced by ‘designated groups’, in order to ensure their ‘equitable 
representation’ in all occupational categories and all levels in the work force.102  
 
The provision of ‘equitable representation’ in terms of the EEA has the same effect as the 
concept of demographic representivity.103 This can be explained to mean that the racial 
diversity of the national population needs to be reflected on each designated employer’s 
workforce.104 From the onset, section 2 of the EEA states that affirmative action measures are 
solely based on the concept of demographics representivity. This concept uses race and gender 
to identify its beneficiaries. Section 2 further uses the term ‘equitable representation’, a term 
                                                          
98 Note 45 above. 
99 K Malan “Observations on representivity, democracy and homogenisation” (2010) 3 TSAR 427.   
100 See sections 174(2), 193(2) and 195(1)(i) of the Constitution. 
101 Note 87 above, 430. 
102 Section 2 of the EEA.   
103 Note 87 above, 430.   
104 Note 87 above, 430 
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which is not used in section 9(2) of the Constitution. The general notion of ‘equality’ as 
discussed above requires people to be afforded equal opportunities.105 
Although the Constitution as a whole does not have ‘equitable representation’ in it, the EEA 
refers to it. The use of this term by the EEA can be seen as a deviation from the known criteria 
for one to qualify as an affirmative action beneficiary.106 For a person to benefit under section 
9(2) of the Constitutional (the affirmative action clause) it is a requirement that such person 
must have suffered from past discrimination. Race and gender are considered to be the major 
factors in terms of section 2 of the EEA for determining who should benefit under affirmative 
action measures. It is imperative to point out that the use of race and gender in terms of 
equitable representation has potential of leading to the unfair differentiation of people in terms 
of section 9(3) of the Constitution. Therefore ‘equitable representation’ can be said to be 
contrary to the principles of ‘equality’ and human dignity.107 
2.5.2 Section 15 of the EEA 
Section 15(1) of the EEA reads as follows:  
“Affirmative action measures are measures designed to ensure that suitably qualified 
people from ‘designated groups’ have equal employment opportunities and are 
equitably represented in all occupational categories and levels in the workforce of a 
designated employer.”  
 
Affirmative action measures are defined in section 15(1) of the EEA. To increase 
representation of historically disadvantaged groups in all units and levels of employment the 
above mentioned measures of affirmative action are designed to promote and advance qualified 
people from the said groups.108 As discussed above, ‘equitable representation’ necessitates that 
the labour force of a designated employer reflect the national demographics of the population. 
                                                          
105 Lloyd Ramutloa “RE: Chinese Association of South Africa” Department of Labour 24 June 2008, available at 
http://www.labour.gov.za/DOL/media-desk/media-statements/2008/re-chinese-association-of-south-africa, 
accessed on 5 March 2015.   
106 See section 9(2) of the Constitution.   
107 Section 1(a) of the Constitution.   
108 Section 15(1) of the EEA.   
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This notion of ‘equitable representation’ as a result goes further than what section 9(2) of the 
Constitution permits and certainly results in quotas.109 
Quota driven remedial measures also ignores merit. 
Section 15(2)(d) of the EEA provides that:  
“Affirmative action measures implemented by a designated employer must include 
…subject to subsection (3), measures to ensure the ‘equitable representation’ of 
suitably qualified people from ‘designated groups’ in all occupational categories and 
levels in the workforce.”110 
 
The way of advancing the concept of demographic representation is supplemented by section 
15(2)(d) of the EEA. Section 15(2)(d) measures are numerical goals which should be used to 
allocate employment quotas per each race group. These numerical goals are informed by 
demographic statistics, making it difficult to execute those measures without implementing 
quotas.  However, section 15(3) of the EEA provides that affirmative action measures “include 
preferential treatment and numerical goals, but exclude quotas.”111 Section 15 of the EEA 
offers a vague safe-guard against quotas because the implementation of numerical goals has 
little difference to the concept of demographic representivity.112 Numerical goals only use a 
flexible criterion but with similar repercussions.113  
Section 15(4) of the EEA provides the following:  
“Subject to section 42, nothing in this section requires a designated employer to take 
any decision concerning an employment policy or practice that would establish an 
absolute barrier to the prospective or continued employment or advancement of people 
who are not from ‘designated groups’.”  
 
                                                          
109 Section 9(2) of the Constitution provides that “equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights 
and freedoms that “To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to 
protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”   
110 Section 15(2)(d) of the EEA. 
111 Section 15(3) of the EEA.   
112 Tapanya  G The constitutionality of the concept of demographic representivity, provided for in terms of the 
Employment Equity Amendment Act 47 of 2013 (Unpublished LLM thesis, University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2015). 
113 Ibid. 
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People from non-‘designated groups’ are protected by this Act. Section 15(4) of the EEA 
disallows an employer from adopting employment policies that creates absolute barriers for the 
advancement, promotion or employment of people from non-’designated groups’. Without the 
lack of authority, section 15(4) could have been a good section. This is because the lack of an 
authoritative term in section 15(4) means that all the other sections that are authoritative 
outweigh it - for example section 42 of the EEA which creates demographic representivity 
requirements to which section 15(4) must surrender to.114 The decision of the CC in 
Barnards115 case is one of the decisions in which the issue of absolute barriers was considered, 
with the CC ruling that Barnard’s exclusion did not create an absolute barrier to her 
appointment, regardless of the fact that she was not appointed to salary level 9 based on 
representivity.116 
2.5.3 Section 42 of the EEA 
To determine whether a designated employer is complying with the EEA’s employment equity 
obligations section 42 of the EEA provides an assessment indicator that must be used by the 
Director-General or any persons or juristic persons applying the Act for this purpose.117 
Furthermore, to add to the factors mentioned in section 15 of the EEA, it is a requirement in 
terms of section 42 that members from ‘designated groups’ are equitably represented in every 
unit and level of employment to be determined in relation to the: 
“demographic profile of the national and regional economically active population; pool 
of suitably qualified people from ‘designated groups’ from which the employer may 
reasonably be expected to promote or appoint employees; economic and financial 
factors relevant to the sector in which the employer operates; present and anticipated 
economic and financial circumstances of the employer; and the number of present and 
planned vacancies that exist in the various categories and levels, and the employer's 
labour turnover.”118 
 
                                                          
114 Ibid. 
115 Note 27 above. 
116 Note 100 above, page 38. 
117 Fourie v South African Police Service (2004) 25 ILJ 1716 (LC) para 1732, 1735.   
118 Section 42(a) of the EEA.   
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The implication of section 42 of the EEA is that the prohibition against quotas is applicable to 
its factors because it states that those factors mentioned in section 15 of the EEA may also be 
considered in the assessment of compliance process. As a result the assessment factors listed 
in section 42 of the EEA in line with section 15(4), which prohibits designated employers from 
adopting employment policies or practices that create absolute barriers for hiring, promotion, 
and professional advancement of members from non-’designated groups’.119 
Though, as mentioned above, section 15(4) of the EEA lacks authoritative wording to make it 
authoritative, the effect of this is that only if a designated employer recognizes 
underrepresentation of a designated group is it allowed to apply the section 42 factors to set 
numerical targets directed at remedying the shortage in their representation.120 However, this 
type of demographic representivity would be one that is concealed in numerical goals. When a 
designated employer pursues goals that are informed by section 15 and 42 factors, such 
affirmative action measures would be legitimate for the purposes of section 15 of the EEA.121 
A measure that does not take cognisance of or deviates from the standard set in section 15 and 
section 42 factors would operate the same way as quotas.122 The problems with regard to the 
application of the Act are still there, particularly with the provision of affirmative action 
benefits in spite of the clear standards of affirmative action measures that were displayed in the 
EEA’s abovementioned provisions for representivity.123 
2.6 The Legal and Practical Effect of the EEAs Provision for Representivity 
As discussed above, the application of the concept of demographic representivity in the EEA 
often promotes unfair discrimination which the Act purports to combat. Divisions in 
employment in the South African labour market is worse off with the implementation of quotas. 
There are legal and practical effects posed by the implementation of demographic 
representivity in terms of the EEA, however this will not be discussed in this research. 
 
 
                                                          
119 Note 87 above, 430. 
120 AM Louw “Extrapolating ‘equality’ from the Letter of the Law: Some Thoughts on the Limits of Affirmative 
Action under the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998” (2006) 18 SAMLJ 341. 
121 Ibid, 342. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Note 87 above, 430. 
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CHAPTER THREE 




As discussed in the previous chapter, there are legal and practical effects posed by the 
implementation of demographic representivity in terms of the EEA. Thus, how one interprets 
the EEA has far-reaching legal and practical implications. Just like any other policy that 
benefits some people and excludes others from benefiting, affirmative action beneficiaries are 
‘for’ it whilst the excluded are ‘against’ it. The arguments ‘for’ and the arguments ‘against’ 
affirmative action will be discussed below. Lastly the question of whether the tension between 
inclusivity and equal opportunity can be bridged in our interpretation of affirmative action will 
be examined. 
 
3.2 Arguments for Affirmative Action 
It is without doubt that people who are benefiting from affirmative action will favour the policy. 
People who advocate for affirmative action consider it as a very important tool for social 
change. Affirmative action is regarded as a necessity to overcome a society that is far from 
being racially, sexually or economically just.124 James P Sterba differentiates between different 
types of affirmative action according to its various goals: outreach affirmative action125, 
remedial affirmative126 action and diversity affirmative action127. The differences between the 
above types of affirmative action can be used to clarify the terms in debates about affirmative 
                                                          
124 James P Sterba, Affirmative Action for the Future (Cornell University Press, 2009) 32-3. 
125 Outreach affirmative action is defined as the attempt to search out ‘qualified woman, minority or 
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the Future (Cornell University Press, 2009) 32-3. 
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of ‘existing discrimination’ practices to create, possibly for the time in a particular setting, a truly non-
discriminatory playing field’). 
127 Ibid. (Diversity affirmative action is also divided into two types: the first subtype is supposed to achieve 
‘educational benefits’, ‘a more effective workforce in such areas as policing or community relation’ and the 
second subtype attempts to ‘more fully achieve equal opportunities’). 
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action policies.128 Particularly in employment opportunities, affirmative action has been 
regarded as an important tool to redress racial and gender based discrimination. This view is 
supported by the following scholars Elaine Kennedy-Dubourdieu, Penelope E Andrews, and 
Barbara Bergmann. 
3.3 Arguments Against Affirmative Action 
Affirmative action targets discrimination by providing preferential treatment to disadvantaged 
groups in society. Discrimination is therefore targeted by affirmative action. Disadvantaged 
groups in society are given preferential treatment. It is important to highlight that preferential 
treatment is a form of positive discrimination. As a result, people who oppose the idea of 
affirmative action hold the view that affirmative action worsens discrimination, rather than 
contributing to its end.129 The question that remains is whether affirmative action be justified 
as an exception to the principle of non-discrimination? The answer to this question is 
debatable.130  
Thomas Sowell argues that the discrimination involved in preferential treatment for minorities 
is no more tolerable than the discrimination it targets to address. He articulated this by saying,  
“Often the claim is made that ‘benign’ preferences (affirmative action) are very 
different from kind of racial discrimination found in the American South during the Jim 
Crow era or apartheid in white-ruled South Africa or the anti-Semitism of the Nazi era. 
But all group preferences are benign to those who benefit-and malign to those who pay 
the price.”131 
 
Affirmative action is said to be burdensome to those individuals of the non-beneficiary groups 
and according to Nicholas Laham this is an unjustified burden. For this reason, those who 
benefit from affirmative action policies are subjected to racist stereotyping and this enhances 
racial divisions.132 This view supported by Terry Eastland who believes that affirmative action 
causes more tension between the majority and the minority groups because it sets the legal 
                                                          
128 Thomas Sowell, Affirmative Action Around the World (Yale University Press) 160. 
129 Glen C Loury, The Anatomy of Racial Inequality (Harvard University Press, 2002) 95-6. 
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grounds for discrimination which is problematic.133 Thomas Sowell134 is regarded as one of the 
leading scholars and has written extensively on affirmative action and is therefore regarded as 
an authority on affirmative action. He supports the arguments presented by Laham and Eastland 
above. He claims that the experimental results135 of affirmative action proves that it is more 
harmful than helpful. He further argues that it is a ‘creation of new evils’ to give preferences 
to disadvantaged groups today as he believes it is not possible to remedy evils of the past by 
giving such preferences.136 In his view, “it is wrong to use group preferences and quotas as a 
remedy for the past discrimination”.137  
Nathan Glazer138 shared a similar view. At first he questioned the usefulness of affirmative 
action policies and claimed affirmative action would be damaging for race relations. However, 
more than 10 years later Glazer changed his opinion about affirmative action, and stated that 
‘without affirmative action, hardly any blacks would gain admission to top colleges, which 
undermines the legitimacy of American democracy’.139 Another agreement presented as to why 
affirmative action is not an appropriate tool for supporting disadvantaged groups in that liberal 
democracies enable all groups to decide their own destinies. Another argument against 
affirmative action is based on the fact that liberal democracies enable all groups to decide their 
own destinies. To expand on this argument Sowell uses this factual illustration:   
‘The successful economic rise of African Americans, Jews and Chinese Americans 
from the beginning of 20th century until the beginning of affirmative action in the 1970s 
in the United States is taken as evidence that affirmative action is not needed to help 
disadvantaged groups today.’140 
 
                                                          
133 Terry Eastland, Ending Affirmative Action (Basic Book, 1997) 195-204. 
134 A conservative African American economic scholar who wrote one of the most important comparative 
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On the basis of ‘principles of individual autonomy and freedom of association’ Richard Epstein 
supports the above claim by arguing that affirmative action policies violate principles of 
individual autonomy and freedom of association.141 He further adds that it is not only the 
autonomy and freedom of non-beneficiaries that is affected, but also that of the supposed 
beneficiaries, who are unavoidably marked as not being able to prosper similarly without the 
support of the governments through affirmative action policies.142   
Notwithstanding the fact that there are criticisms of affirmative action, this research continues 
on the basis that affirmative action is an appropriate response to discrimination. However, this 
is the case only if the policy of affirmative action is designed in a way that property addresses 
the causes of discrimination. This is because the way affirmative action is designed must take 
into account consideration not only the different forms of discrimination, but also different 
ways to address them.143  
 
3.4 Can the Tension between Inclusivity and Equal Opportunity be Bridged in Our 
Interpretation of Affirmative Action? 
The concepts and ideas discussed above explain and give a clear picture of what affirmative 
action is all about. However, the question that remains is whether it is possible to manage the 
tension between the racial nature and racial exclusivism of affirmative action and also to meet 
the Constitutional requirement opportunities for all? Put differently, is it possible to have an 
interpretation of affirmative action that is inclusive and at the same time providing equal 
opportunities for all. 
The desirability of a measure on a particular society can be determined by looking at its effect 
after implementation of that particular measure.144 Interpretation of affirmative action has been 
such that groups previously disadvantaged have been categorised.145 As a result groups that 
have been previously disadvantaged do not benefit equally from affirmative action.146 
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The basis for such different treatment of the previously disadvantaged groups is that apartheid 
had racial hierarchies therefore it would be an undue disregard of the suffering experienced by 
different groups.147 Monseneke J in Van Heerden148 held that “differentiation among members 
of the designated groups requires that social, historical and legal evidence be led before the 
court can depart from according similar treatment to members of designated groups”.149 
As mentioned above, the Van Heerden case was the first case decided in the CC dealing directly 
with affirmative action. The CC in this case decided to follow a contextual approach. The 
Barnard case, also a CC judgment will be discussed below. In Van Heerden the court pointed 
out that the resolution of this difficult question (the possibility of having an interpretation of 
affirmative action that is inclusive and at the same time providing equal opportunities for all) 
is not an abstract one, but one that is dependent on each country’s constitutional design, history 
and social context. The court further stated that if one takes South Africa’s constitutional 
design, history and social context into account, the Constitution calls for an adoption of an 
approach that goes beyond equal treatment and an understanding of social and economic 
equality between individuals and groups. Put differently, courts are directed to go beyond 
formal equality and more towards substantive equality.150 
The reasoning behind the substantive approach is entrenched in South Africa’s past. In 
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v Minister of Justice and 
Others151 the CC explained it in the following terms: 
“Particularly in a country such as South Africa, persons belonging to certain categories 
have suffered considerable unfair discrimination in the past.  It is insufficient for the 
Constitution merely to ensure, through its Bill of Rights, that statutory provisions which 
have caused such unfair discrimination in the past are eliminated.  Past unfair 
discrimination frequently has ongoing negative consequences, the continuation of 
which is not halted immediately when the initial causes thereof are eliminated, and 
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unless remedied, may continue for a substantial time and even indefinitely.  Like 
justice, equality delayed is equality denied”.152 
 
It is incorrect to look at affirmative action measures as presumptively unfair if they are essential 
to our understanding of equality.153 A complete defence to claim that positive measures 
constitutes unfair discrimination is provided by section 9(2) of the Constitution. It is however 
a requirement that for one to succeed in this defence, they must prove compliance with internal 
conditions established in section 9(2). 
In determining whether a measure is in line with the ambit of section 9(2) the courts have 
initiated a new venture and have established a pattern for the consideration of all future 
affirmative action claims, including claims under the EEA. The general approach can be 
labelled as one of restraint and deference:  
“Courts must be reluctant to interfere with such measures, and exercise due restraint 
when tempted to interpose themselves as arbiters as to whether the measure could have 
been proceeded with in a better or less onerous way.  At the same time, if the measure 
at issue is manifestly overbalanced in ignoring or trampling on the interests of members 
of the advantaged section of the community, and gratuitously and flagrantly imposes 
disproportionate burdens on them, the courts have a duty to interfere.  Given our 
historical circumstances and the massive inequalities that plague our society, the 
balance when determining whether a measure promotes equality is fair will be heavily 
weighted in favour of opening up opportunities for the disadvantaged”.154 
 
This approach has been followed and confirmed by the Labour Court in Alexandre155 the level 
of enquiry of positive measures is for that reason lower than that which applies to unfair 
discrimination. Above all there is less emphasis on the negative effect. The measure which 
would generally be on an advantage group and more attention is placed on the disadvantaged 
group. Regardless of this tranquil level of scrutiny of affirmative action measures, the court 
nevertheless made it clear that overindulgences or abuse will not be tolerated:  
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“if the measure at issue is manifestly overbalanced in ignoring or trampling on the 
interests of members of the advantaged section of the community, and gratuitously and 
flagrantly imposes disproportionate burdens on them, the courts have a duty to 
interfere”.156 
 
There is a proposed two stage test. Affirmative action programmes must be subjected to this 
test. The first is whether there was unfair discrimination and whether it falls foul of section 
9(3) of the Constitution. On passing this test the programme would then have to be judged as 
to whether it complies with provisions of the Constitution.157 It is submitted that the approach 
followed in the Van Heerden case seems to be the answer to the question raised in this research. 
‘If one takes South Africa’s constitutional design, history and social context into account, the 
Constitution calls for an adoption of an approach that goes beyond equal treatment to some 
understanding of social and economic equality between individuals and groups’. South Africa 
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CHAPTER FOUR 




As said above, if one takes South Africa’s constitutional design, history and social context into 
account the protection provided by the Constitution must be for all South Africans.158 The 
jurisprudence on the concept of affirmative action in South Africa is developing rapidly and 
this is illustrated by the history of the seven year-long litigation of Barnard’s case159. This case 
is considered a leading case because of its significant contributions to the jurisprudence and 
affirmative action principles. Most importantly, this case confirms that affirmative action is a 
proper defence to the charge of discrimination, by laying down the test for lawfulness of the 
implementation of affirmative action. This case points out that the EEA in mandating 
affirmative action which requires the exercise of a discretion that comprehends a balancing of 
all the factors relevant to the decision.160 A critical analysis will be attempted of this leading 
Constitutional Court judgment on the concept of affirmative action measures and their standard 
of review in this chapter. 
 
4.1 Facts 
Ms Renate Barnard a white female police officer was denied promotion to a level 9 post of 
Superintendent on two different instances besides the fact that she was found to be the most 
suitable candidate for the post. This was because the commissioner wanted to ensure the 
effective pursuit of the numerical goals for racial representivity set out in the South African 
Police Services (SAPS) affirmative action policy. The commissioner (who had the discretion 
to appoint or not) defended his decision by saying it was in line with efforts to attain equitable 
representivity in its workforce regime. Ms Renate Barnard however challenge the 
commissioner’s decision on the basis that it constituted direct discrimination because the only 
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reason she was denied promotion was her racial identity (ground of race in terms of section 
6(1) the EEA). She argued that to deny her promotion infringed her right to equality as well as 
an affront to her dignity. The second best candidates (black males) were not appointed. The 
situation was worsened when the post was left vacant simply because a suitable candidate could 
not be found from the designated group.  
4.2 Issue 
The issue in this case was whether Ms Barnard had been unfairly discriminated against on the 
ground of race. It is important to highlight that this issue could only be adjudicated upon by 
determining the lawfulness of the way the SAPS commissioner had implemented the 
department’s Employment Policy and Plan (EEP). 
 
4.3 Labour Court Decision161 
The Labour Court decided that the commissioner’s decision not to promote Ms Barnard did 
not comply with the provisions of the EEA. The decision was said to have been based on race 
and constituted unfair discrimination.  It held that the EEP which the commissioner relied on 
had to be applied in accordance with the Constitutional principles of equality and fairness. 
Furthermore the Labour Court found that the strict application of numerical goals was too rigid. 
The court concluded that the commissioner had failed to discharge the onus of fairness of its 
prima facie discriminatory decision considering that the reasons given for its decision were 
insufficient, and therefore found in favour of Ms Barnard. The Labour Court came to this 
decision after balancing the interests that were in conflict that is, weighing up ‘need for 
representivity ’against‘ the individual’s rights to equality. The commissioner appealed this 
decision to the Labour Appeal Court. 
 
4.4 Labour Appeal Court Decision162 
The Labour Appeal Court firstly highlighted that the purpose of having restitutionary measures 
would be defeated if the implementation of the very same restitutionary measures could not be 
made subject to an individual’s right to equality. Moreover, the Court stated that the fact that 
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there would be persons from non-designated groups who would at adversely affected was a 
reality. As the post had been left vacant, the Labour Appeal Court found on this basis that no 
discrimination had occurred and set aside the order made by the Labour Court. According to 
Fredman ‘Discrimination can occur where a person’s aspirations have been barricaded on the 
basis of an immutable character like race’.163 The basis for this Court’s decision was the 
absence of a comparator. While a comparator is an essential factor when deciding whether 
there has been discrimination, it cannot on its own dissuade an outcome of discrimination. The 
requirement for an allegation of discrimination is that it needs to be a determination of the 
impact that is on the individual complaining. As a result the finding of the Labour Appeal Court 
can be said to be ‘cherry-picked’ as only a part that enabled it was able to get to a desired 
decision.164 Ms Barnard appealed to the Supreme Court Appeal. 
 
4.5 Supreme Court Appeal Decision165 
The Supreme Court of Appeal followed the decision of the Labour Court and found that Ms 
Barnard had been unfairly discriminated against when the commissioner denied her promotion. 
Similar to the Labour Court’s reasoning, this Court based its decision on the insufficiency of 
the commissioner’s reasons for failing to appoint Ms Barnard. In reaching its decision, the SCA 
relied on section 9(3) of the Constitution (the mistake of relying on this section was later 
addressed by the Constitutional Court) and this reliance confirmed what the LAC had 
incorrectly held, (specifically that the Labour Court had subjected affirmative action to the 
equality of an individual right). It overturned the decision of the LAC. Affirmative action 
measures were held to be a compromise of the right to be treated equally and therefore needed 
to be subject to an exacting scrutiny in PSA v Minster of Justice.166 The judge further held that 
‘in deciding the appropriateness of an affirmative action measure, the word ‘equal’ must be 
taken to denote that the interests of the beneficiaries are not to be considered in a vacuum, but 
with due regard to the rights of others, and to the possible disadvantage that the targeted persons 
or groups might suffer’. This is the same approach followed by the LC and later the SCA. The 
commissioner took the decision further to the Constitutional Court. 
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4.6 The Constitutional Court Decision 
The outcome of the Constitutional Court was not only eagerly awaited by the parties who had 
direct interest in case but the South African community nationwide. The reason for this was 
that the South African Constitution embraces an equality-driven concept of affirmative 
action167 which raises questions with regards to the suitability and appropriate judicial standard 
for the implementation of such affirmative action measures. The central issue raised in this case 
relates to the appropriate and applicable judicial standard in determining Ms Barnard’s 
grievances which falls within the bounds of affirmative action measures. The Labour Court, 
Labour Appeal Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal had opposing judgments. All 
judgments were expected to bring understanding and direction on the determination of the 
appropriate and applicable judicial standard for the implementation of affirmative action 
measures. However, uncertainty on the ongoing question of the appropriate and applicable 
judicial standard for the implementation of affirmative action measures resulted in the litigants 
not getting the relief sought. As a result, the critical evaluation of the judicial standard had to 
be determined by the Constitutional Court. 
The established principles laid down in the Van Heerden case regarding the appropriate and 
applicable judicial standard for the implementation of measures were confirmed by the 
Constitutional Court in a majority judgment. The Constitutional Court however arrived at this 
decision using a different route as there were different opinions expressed from the majority 
and the minority in reaching their conclusions. Moseneke DCJ in the majority judgment wrote 
that the judicial standard for review is the rationality standard and, while it is the bare minimum 
requirement, it suffices and there is no need to define the standard finally. The precision of this 
decision will be evaluated by a critical analysis of this judgment. 
4.6.1 Commentary on the Van Heerden Judgement 
The Constitutional Court’s confirmations of the Van Heerden legal principles makes it 
necessary for this research to firstly look at the ratio of the case. In short, the failure of this 
judgment to incorporate fairness into its standard which led to it been criticised.168 Section 36 
of the Constitution sets out the general standard of review. However, according to Rautenbach 
the approach taken in this judgment pays deference towards the state actors involved in drafting 
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and implementing affirmative action measures which consequently is out of line with the 
general standard of review set out by the drafters of the Constitution.169 Malan’s contribution 
is that the “rationality standard may also implicate a separation of power when one considers 
the role of the courts in respect of constitutional adjudication (and their discrete oversight over 
the conduct of the executive)”170 In contrast, other commentators have emphasised the fact that 
Moseneke DCJ in this case, aside from his inflexible choice of the rationality standard, in fact 
applied a form of fairness review.171 The views of this commentators can be considered enough 
to invite opposing judgments in the abovementioned courts. 
4.6.2 The Protection Provided in Section 9(2) of the Constitution 
Moseneke DCJ’s submission that “our state must direct reasonable public resources to achieve 
substantive equality for full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms”172 was well 
intended. As opposed to his view that affirmative action measures cannot be presumed to be 
unfair in their impact on members of the non-designated groups173 because holding such a view 
can be counterproductive. McGregor on the other hand believes that “any denial that legitimate 
restitutionary measures can be unfair in its application would be facetious”.174 Regardless of 
the fact that legitimate restitutionary measures can be unfair in their application Moseneke 
believes such application must be lawful.175 
4.6.3 The rationality standard  
According to Moseneke DCJ affirmative action measures and their implementation are subject 
to judicial scrutiny.176 For this reason he is correct when he says that ‘the measures that are 
directed at remedying the past discrimination must be formulated with due respect not to impact 
unfairly the dignity of all concerned.177 It is correct that we need to be cautious of the remedial 
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measures under the Constitution so as to prevent them from becoming an end in themselves, 
as they are not meant to be punitive and retaliatory.178 The judge in Du Preez179 confirmed that 
the enactment of the national legislation in the form of two measures: firstly, the EEA and, 
secondly, the Equality Act180 was a compliance by parliament to the mandate of section 9 (4) 
of the Constitution and further stated that these Acts flowed from and continue to give effect 
to section 9(3) of the equality clause in the Constitution.181 
Section 6(2) of the EEA provides that it is not unfair to take affirmative action measures 
consistent with the purpose of EEA, which is as follows:  
‘The purpose of this Act is to achieve equity in the workplace by -  
(a) promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment through the 
elimination of unfair discrimination; and  
(b) implementing affirmative action measures to redress the disadvantages in  
employment experienced by designated groups, in order to ensure their equitable 
representation in all occupational levels in the workforce.’182 
 
The minority judgment viewed Ms Barnard’s claim (of unfair discrimination which is a 
contravention of the EEA) as one which required an additional standard to rationality.183 In 
addition to that, the implementation of affirmative action measures can result in tension or 
conflict between Constitutional values, therefore courts are expected to scrutinize and examine 
implementation with a more thorough level.184 There is a gap for an additional standard to a 
rationality standard. The call for an additional standard of fairness by the minority seems to be 
a step in the right direction. 
The Constitutional Court looked into section 15 and 13 of the EEA. The enquiry looked at the 
preferential treatment, numeral goals and exclusion of quotas as well as the compliance as to 
whether there was a plan or not, and the legitimacy of that plan. These provisions were looked 
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at in conjunction with section 2 and 6(2) of the EEA. The results of the inquiry showed that the 
plan or the racial and gender targets it embodied were not challenged in Ms Barnard’s claim.185 
Accordingly, the Constitutional Court could not challenge the decision- maker’s stated reasons 
on this point as there was the absence of a proper challenge and argument.186 The formulation 
and implementation of affirmative action measures were not challenged on the basis of fairness, 
validity or legitimacy as they were in accordance with section 13 obligations and section 15 
read with section 2 of the EEA.187 
The findings of the minority in this judgment established that the facts of the case pointed that 
the commissioner’s decision not to appoint Ms Barnard passes the fairness standard.188 For the 
minority, the decisive factor was the evidence of over-representation of white women at the 
salary level to which Ms Barnard was applying.189 
Ngcobo J appealed that transformation ought to be carried out in line with the Constitution.190 
This is followed by Moseneke DCJ in his judgment.191 It is as a result a requirement that in 
order for a measure to avoid being constitutionally invalid, it must comply with the protection 
test standard provided in section 9(2).192 As soon as the measure passes the foregoing test, 
Moseneke DCJ notes, it is neither unfair nor presumed to be unfair.193 He makes the allegation 
that this statement is given expression by the Constitution.194 However, Moseneke DCJ’s 
interpretation when read into section 9 (2) finds expression in section 6(2) of EEA, and not 
section 9 (2) of the Constitution. His claim puts measures beyond the purview of the EEA, 
irrespective of their content and effect on others.195 The extent and nature of protection here is 
according to Erasmus J questionable. The question raised here is “if the provisions of 
subsection (2) of section 9 were to be interpreted as constituting an exception to the unfair 
discrimination proscribed by subsection (3), then persons disadvantaged by affirmative action 
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measures would have no protection under the equality rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution?”196 
Van der Westhuizen J clarifies this confusion of whether or not affirmative action measures 
are an exception by explaining that section 9 and the measures provided for in section 9(2) 
form part of the right to equality and they are not an exception to them.197 Moreover he notes 
that the suitable assumption under our Constitutional framework is that restitutionary or 
affirmative measures should be applauded rather than viewed with doubt.198 
4.6.4 The Interpretation of Section 9(2) of the Constitution 
The Constitution is the supreme law of South Africa. When interpreting a statute or looking at 
its ambit and tenets the Constitution ought to be the starting point.199 Section 39 provides that 
courts must ‘promote the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights when interpreting any 
legislation’. Ngcobo J understood this section to mean: ‘firstly, the interpretation that is placed 
upon a statute must, where possible, be one that would advance at least an identifiable value 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights and, secondly, the statute must be reasonably capable of such 
interpretation.’200 He further says that the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of our Constitutional 
democracy and this interpretation is an attribute of that fact as it upholds the democratic values 
of human dignity, equality and freedom.201 Therefore the promotion of the values of our 
Constitutional democracy must be seen when one interprets a provision.202 
Interpreting affirmative action measures to mean they cannot be presumed to be unfair (in 
reading the equality rights) is an intra- textual approach, which is foreign in our law as it is 
quite far out of the target of subsection 2 of section 9 of the Constitution.203 Applying this 
interpretation to the implied double test set out by Ngcobo J above. Test: firstly, the 
interpretation that is placed upon a statute must, where possible, be one that would advance at 
least an identifiable value enshrined in the Bill of Rights (in this case this interpretation does 
not advance at least identifiable value enshrined in the Bill of Rights, therefore it will be bound 
to fail). Secondly, the statute must be reasonably capable of such interpretation (in this case 
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this interpretation is not reasonably capable of being sourced from the reading of the equality 
right).  
The concern pointed out here is valid because by saying that affirmative action measures cannot 
be presumed unfair means there is no regard to the effect of the measure on the individual 
members of non- designated groups. In an instance where one presumes that this reading 
advances at least an identifiable value enshrined in the Bill of Rights, the presumption fails 
because this interpretation is not realistically capable of being sourced from the interpretation 
of the equality right of the Constitution. 
The mandate by s 9(2) of the Constitution is given effect to by the EEA. It is important however 
that when courts apply the Bill of Rights, they must promote all the values that are 
fundamentally protected in the Bill of Rights. The results of this is that courts cannot allow the 
barring or reduction of a fundamental right even by another Constitutional right, and especially 
not by any other statute.204 As a general rule, the Constitution is not subjected to rules that 
govern the interpretation of the ordinary law, for this reason it is convincing to call for an 
approach that is ‘acutely sensitive to all Constitutional values and objectives.’205 putting this in 
context, ‘an interpretation of s 9(2) of the Constitution that sees its implicit approval of 
affirmative action measures as excluding or negating the right to equality, will therefore offend 
constitutional principle.’206 
4.6.5 The Appropriateness of the Rationality Standard  
The question of how affirmative action measures were to be properly adopted and further 
whether they could be challenged was addressed by Moseneke DCJ. His evaluation findings 
were in the affirmative.207 His conclusion found no legal reason ‘why courts are precluded from 
deciding whether a valid employment equity plan has been put into practice lawfully’.208 
Without doubt he expressed that ‘a validly adopted employment equity plan must be put to use 
lawfully’.209 A simple comment on this would be to point out the fact that this statement 
disagrees with his debatable statement that ‘measures cannot be presumed unfair’.  
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This statement is however seen in a different light by Rautenbach, as she says “the only logical 
implication is that the determination of the lawfulness of the implementation of affirmative 
action measures otherwise rational measure must be its fairness and or the impact of such 
implementation on the right of those disadvantaged by it”.210 Moseneke DCJ is found to have 
uncovered the unsuitability of the rationality standard of review when he chose a bare minimum 
standard, and with regards to the legality principle, the ‘implementation of measures would 
require to be rationally related to the terms and objects of the measure.’211 
The application of measures must reflect nothing else but their legitimate purpose. 
Unlawfulness is attracted by irrational conduct when a lawful project is being implemented. 
Furthermore, the position that it is not necessary to define the standard (as much as this 
rationality standard is the bare minimum requirements) was repeated by Moseneke DCJ, and 
further that the implementation of corrective measures must be rational.212 It appears that this 
definite statement on the lawfulness implementation would suggest that a flawlessly rational 
measure can be abused.213 The point raised by Rautenbach here is that if the rationality standard 
“in terms of Van Heerden’s interpretation of the internal test for compliance as found in section 
9 (2) is truly sufficient to mark such measure as constitutionally compliant, then this 
consideration regarding the implementation of measures must be surely irrelevant”.214  
Despite the deference showed by the other Constitutional Court judges in Moseneke DCJ’s 
main judgment, the judicial standard cannot be said to be sufficient and appropriateness of the 
rational standard remains debatable. This is further supported by the fact that three judges 
(Cameron J, Froneman J and Majiedt AJ) implied that they were against this judicial 
standard.215 Their approach to this was that the case required them to apply a less deferential 
standard than mere rationality.216 This approach confidently stresses the unsuitability of the 
rationality standard. In Van Heerden Moseneke DCJ stated that “a measure should not 
constitute an abuse of power or impose such substantial and undue harm on those excluded 
from its benefits that our long-term constitutional goal would be threatened”.217 
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Rautenbach seems to be correct when she says a “reference to the substantial harm to those 
excluded from benefits simply cannot refer merely to the lawfulness of implementation of a 
measure being measured with reference to rationality; it must require interrogation of the 
fairness of such implementation”.218 
It is submitted that this research agrees with Rautenbach in terms of this decision as one cannot 
not be fair in implementing affirmative action. Ms Barnard fell within the designated group of 
women. Her being a white woman did not change the fact that she was still a woman yet they 
still refused to fill the position. Yes affirmative action was in play but in implementing it there 
was no other candidates for the position from that group. The question one has to ask is for 
how long were they going to leave the position vacant whilst there was an individual from a 
designated group who qualified for the post. This means they were willing to sacrifice service 
delivery for affirmative action. It is submitted that this is not how affirmative action was 
supposed to be implemented. It is submitted that as Rautenbach puts it, it is fairness that counts. 
 
4.7 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others219 
Having looked at the Barnard’s case, which focussed more on the appropriate judicial standard 
for the implementation of legitimate affirmative action measures it is important to also look at 
this Constitutional Court judgment which applied the principles established in the Barnard case 
and focusses more on demographic targets. 
4.7.1 Facts 
The Department adopted the 2010 Employment Plan which was to be in operation for the year 
2010 to 2014. The target set in the Plan were based on the demographic profile of the national 
population issued by Statistics South Africa in 2005.  Levels of representation of a number of 
racial and gender groups within the Departments workforce were assessed using that 
demographic profile, with the Department finding that Coloured persons and women were 
overrepresented at certain occupational levels. The Department assessed its level of racial and 
gender group representation solely on national demographics. In 2011 vacant posts were 
advertised in the Western Cape by the Department of Correctional Services. Ten members of 
Solidarity (union) were among those individuals that applied for the posts. This included five 
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coloured women, four coloured men and one white male. Out of the ten individuals, nine were 
recommended for appointment however the Department refused to appoint them to the 
positions they were recommended for due to gender and race considerations which according 
to the Department were ‘overrepresented’.220 
4.7.2 Issues 
The court was required to consider whether the Barnard principle’s (which says that an 
employer may refuse to appoint a candidate who falls within a category of persons that is 
already adequately represented at a certain occupational level) application is limited to white 
people only and whether this principle may also be applied in respect of gender. The court had 
to also look at whether there was unfair labour practice and unfair discrimination. 
4.7.3 Labour Court Decision221 
Solidarity had three main arguments for their case. Firstly, it argued that the 2010 Employment 
Plan did not comply with among others section 42222 of the Employment Act and was therefore 
invalid. Secondly, it argued that the targets contained in the 2010 Employment Plan were not 
numerical targets but quotas which are outlawed by the EEA. Lastly it argued that the 
Department’s decision not to appoint the individual applicants constituted unfair labour 
practices and acts of unfair discrimination based on race and gender and should be set aside 
and the individual applicants should be appointed to their recommended posts.  
The Department also had three counter arguments. Firstly, it argued that it was authorised to 
only use the demographic profile of the national population because it is a national department. 
Secondly, it argued that its 2010 Employment Plan did comply with the EEA. Lastly, it argued 
that based on the Bernard’s principle it was entitled to have refused to appoint the individual 
applicants because they all belonged to categories of people that were already overrepresented 
at the occupational levels to which they had sought to be appointed. 
Having looked at both the applicant’s and the respondent’s submissions, the Labour Court ruled 
in favour of Solidarity after finding the DCS to have failed to comply with the EEA with 
regards to its numerical targets and its failure to take into considerations of the demographic 
                                                          
220 Ibid. 
221 Solidarity v Department of Correctional Services and Others (2014) 35 ILJ 1647 (LC). 
222 Before it was amended, section 42 obliged a designated employer to take into account the demographic 
profile of not only the national but also the regional economically active population in assessing whether the 
designated groups were equitably represented and in setting the targets for its employment equity plan.  
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profile of the regional economically active population. The Employment Plan was found to be 
valid and the Solidarity claim of invalidity was rejected. Regardless of the fact that the Labour 
Court found that the DCS should have taken into account the demographic profile of both the 
national and regional economically active population in setting its numerical targets, it did not 
grant the individual applicants any individual relief. The applicants further appealed this 
decision to the Labour Appeal Court. 
4.7.4 Labour Appeal Court Decision223 
The appeal was based on the Labour Court’s decision not to grant the individual applicants any 
relief and also the failure of the LC to declare the EEP invalid because of its not compliance 
with section 42. This appeal was dismissed by the LAC after finding that the EEP passed the 
test set in terms of EEA, read together with the Constitution.  
4.7.5 Constitutional Court Decision 
This is a judgment by Justice Zondo. Moseneke DCJ, Jafta J, Khampepe J, Nkabinde J and van 
der Westhuizen J also agree with it. With regards to the second argument made by the applicant, 
the CC firmly disagreed with Solidarity’s claims that the targets contained in the 2010 
Employment Plan were quotas, and only finding the targets to be numerical targets which 
were applied with flexibility.224 The CC also addressed the question of whether the Barnard 
principle’s application is limited to white people only and whether this principle may also be 
applied in respect of gender. The CC held that candidates from designated groups were also 
subject to the so-called Barnard principle therefore ‘an employer may refuse to appoint a 
candidate who falls within a category of persons e.g. women, Coloured or Indian or African 
persons who are already adequately represented at a particular occupational level’.225  
In answering the question of whether or not the EEP was invalid Justice Zondo concluded that, 
since the 2010 Employment Plan had run its course, there was no need for it to be held to be 
invalid.226 However, the CC’s final finding was that failing to take into account the 
demographic profile of the regional and national economically active population and only using 
the demographic profile of the national population in assessing the level of representation of 
the various groups and in setting the numerical targets for its 2010 Employment Plan the DCS 
                                                          
223 Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others (2015) 36 ILJ 1848 (LAC). 
224 Note 210 above, para 114. 
225 Ibid, para 40. 
226 Ibid, para 35. 
 42 
breached obligations under section 42 of the EEA. On the basis that section 42 does not exclude 
national departments from its application the CC rejected the DCS’s argument that because it 
is a national department, it is excluded from the requirement to consider both national and 
regional demographics. 
This judgment was also supported by Nugent AJ (Cameron J concurring) in a separate 
judgment. Nugent AJ’s reasoning was that ‘even without the requirement of that section, the 
relevant profile of the population included its distribution, not merely its racial proportions, 
and the failure to bring that to account was irrational and thus unlawful’.227  He also added that 
‘the 2010 Employment Plan imposed quotas on appointments, which is prohibited by the Act, 
and on that ground, too, the 2010 Employment Plan was unlawful’. The DCS was therefore 
found to have used a wrong benchmark – one that was not authorised by the EEA.228 As a 
result, the DCS had no justification for using race and gender to refuse to appoint the individual 
applicants and that, therefore, the decisions not to appoint most of the individual applicants 
constituted acts of unfair discrimination and also acts of unfair labour practices.229 
The CC’s final order was the following: the coloured applicants, who were recommended for 
appointment, be appointed to the relevant posts, to the extent that those posts were vacant and 
be paid the remuneration attached to those posts with retrospective effect. Concerning the 
applicants whose posts were currently occupied, the court ordered that the DCS pay the 
applicants the remuneration attached to those posts with retrospective effect. 
 
4.8 Commentary  
Evidence points to the fact that the rationality standard of review fails to balance competing 
interests, rights and values protected by the Constitution. This was also exposed by Moseneke 
DCJ in the majority judgment of the Constitutional Court. For this reason, it would not be 
unreasonable for one to call for a fairness test as a judicial standard of review having considered 
the concerns by Moseneke DCJ in Van Heerden and Barnard, along with Van der Westhuizen 
J that ‘measures are understood as equality-driven mechanisms in their own right, rather than 
carve-outs from what is discriminatory’. Considering our constitutional context, what seems to 
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be appropriate is that restitutionary or affirmative measures should be applauded rather than 
viewed with doubted. . 
Our Constitution is designed in such a way that it is able to deal with issues such as Ms 
Barnard’s. When there are competing interests, rights and values section 36 (limitation clause) 
is the tool to be used to resolve those issues. Section 36 limitation clause is the best judicial 
standard of review. Therefore the continuing legal issue about the appropriate judicial standard 
for the implementation of legitimate affirmative action measures can also be dealt with 
perfectly using the section 36 formula.  
Moving on to the Solidarity judgment , what Justice Zondo highlights in the this judgment 
should serve as a reminder to employers who fall within the requirements of section 42 that 
their obligations in conducting their workplace analysis as per section 19 of the EEA, and in 
setting numerical goals and targets in their EEP that they have to take into account both the 
national and the regional or provincial demographics of EAP as per section 42 because as we 
have seen in this case that if employers only consider the national and leave out the provincial 
or the regional demographics of EAP then this could lead to unfair discrimination and unfair 
labour practise. What is important about this judgment is that it give us clarity with regards to 
the requirements, procedurally, to achieve a ‘transformed’ workplace which is compliant with 
the EEA. Moreover the point that Justice Zondo makes here is that it is very important for 
employers to be very cautious before rejecting an applicant’s appointment because it does not 
fit in with their targets in their EEP. 
The importance of adhering to EEP’s is demonstrated in the Unisa v Reynhardt230 case. The 
Labour Appeal Court judges demonstrated that there is a lifecycle in an affirmative action 
policy which employers must be mindful of. The judgment gives us an indication of the 
instances when affirmative action can cease to be applied, however it is clear that in an instance 
that is specific to a particular employer and the wording within that employer's EEP the 
employer is obligated to have a comprehensive EEP that is able to withstand constitutional 
scrutiny. Moreover, this case also points out to the reality that the legacy of apartheid and the 
disparity it created will take time to eradicate through the application of affirmative action.231 
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Our Constitution is set up in a way that racial dominance is eliminated as all races are 
recognised as equal. Having said that, the Constitutional Court in this case emphasizes this 
point in that it makes it positively flawless that there is no room for racial domination in South 
Africa. Once again the South African judicial body has showed that it is outstanding when it 
comes to promotion and protection of our long fought for democracy. Among other things the 
Constitution is based on values of ‘non-racialism’232, further the Constitution prohibits the State 
from among other things directly or indirectly unfair discrimination on ‘race’233 and Freedom 
Charter stated that “The rights of the people shall be the same regardless of race, colour or 
sex”. All the above can be said to have been re-affirmed in this judgment and this judgment 
can be seen as a defeat for non-racism. George Devenish correctly predicted that this 
Constitutional Court judgment ‘will have a major effect on other government departments both 
at national and provincial level as Solidarity has already indicated that it will be using the 
judgment against the SAPS where a number of posts have been frozen, pending the decision 
of the Constitutional Court in relation to a Correctional Services case (Solidarity obo Members 
v South African Police Service234)’.235 Statistically in South Africa Africans dominate as a 
majority by approximately 80% and the rest of the population is made up of a 20% minority.236 
However if one looks at the regional demography of the Western Cape coloured people make 
up approximately 50% of the population.  
According to De Vos 237 this judgment “is a text of its time and goes further than previous 
Constitutional Court judgments in insulating redress measures from constitutional attack. The 
judgment would make it difficult to invalidate employment equity measures unless they allow 
for the appointment of unqualified candidates or are implemented in a corrupt or nepotistic 
manner. In this sense, it may well be far less of a victory for the litigants than they might at 
first have thought”.238 
It is submitted that this research agrees with De Vos in this case. De Vos is a constitutional law 
scholar and has articulately pointed out that this judgment can also be said to be a victory for 
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diversity and the protection of vulnerable minorities against the dominant Africans given that 


























RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
In terms of the discussions above, it is submitted that the issue addressed in this research is that 
affirmative action is not the problem but implementation of it is the problem. Affirmative action 
is not yet complete, it needs to be taken further. Now that affirmative action has been on the 
ground for a while, we need to start looking at implementing it properly. The problem is not 
only about the implementation of affirmative action but also the perception that society has 
with regard to this concept. At first glance affirmative action seems to be a process that 
excludes certain groups which gives the perception that it is unfair discrimination whereas this 
is not so.  
As said above, affirmative action is a process of equalling the playing field by extending 
equality to previously disadvantaged groups. The function of affirmative is not to exclude but 
to include those who were excluded. For example, if there are two applicants (a black male and 
a white male) for a single post, if affirmative action applies, it can be seen to exclude the white 
male but this perception of looking at it in that particular way is misguided. As the point of 
affirmative action is not to exclude the white person but to include the black person who was 
previously excluded. Affirmative action addresses the problem of exclusion.  
It is submitted that this research is highlighting the idea that affirmative action is good as it 
equalises the playing fields but the implementation of it needs to be relooked at. Even though 
affirmative action may seem to some as unfair discrimination, it is fair in terms of our 
constitution. However, the implementation of affirmative action is not what it is supposed to 
be because presently it is all about filling quotas thus making issues such as delivering effective 
service delivery at risk because by merely filling quotas employers are putting employees into 
positions that they are unable to do justice to.  Government departments and companies are 
putting people into positions that are ill-prepared or simply not skilled enough. It is therefore 
submitted that in levelling the playing fields these employers must employ people in terms of 
affirmative action that have the skill, education and all that is required to do the job properly.  
It is submitted that training programmes should be implemented by employers to potential 
employees to place those particular previously disadvantaged employees at a level where the 
employers want them to be. For example, if the Department of Justice employs an LLB 
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graduate with no practical experience as a legal advisor, that particular graduate fulfils the 
education requirement but has no practical experience, therefore it is submitted that further 
training must be provided to the appointable candidate in order for them to be able to cope 
sufficiently enough to be able to carry out the full requirements of the job.  Many companies 
and even government departments do not have theses training programmes in place. This turn 
to create a situation where the newly appointed affirmative action employee is left to their own 
devices in order to survive in the workplace. If it so happens that that employee fails at the job 
that they have been put into affirmative action is blamed and immediately there is a perception 
that the employee is incompetent. By not having programmes in place to level the playing fields 
sufficiently enough is tantamount to setting up affirmation action appointments to fail. It is 
therefore submitted that this training for affirmative action appointments should be a 
requirement for every potential employer. It is further submitted that this particular kind of 
trainings will create confidence in these particular appointees and allow them to believe not 
only in themselves but in the fact that they were not merely offered the position because of the 
colour of their skin. This will in turn have a positive effect in the workplace and most 
importantly, service delivery.  It is submitted that this is one of the most practical ways to deal 
with affirmative action employees. In-still confidence in these appointees in order to get the 
best out of them.  
It is submitted that the issues addressed in this dissertation is that affirmative action is not at an 
end. This means instead of us seeing affirmative action as a problem, it is actually an instrument 
(although painful to some) to equality.  Regardless of how we look at affirmative action, the 
law values the fundamental tenant of equality. Therefore, affirmative action is as a result a 
means to create a just society, and a just society is one that treats people equally. It is further 
submitted that as much as section 42 provides that affirmative action should be a combination 
of education, skills development and employment opportunities, there should real 
implementation of this suggested combination in order to implement affirmative action 
successfully. On a practical level companies that are implementing affirmative action measures 
should consider this combination seriously in order to further affirmative action appointees: 
Education 
Section 15 of the EEA requires the persons from designated groups to be suitably qualified. 
This means that the people from the designated groups must have qualifications as a condition 
to enjoy this benefit provided by this provision. I recommend that the government needs to take 
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further steps in enable people from designated groups to meet this condition. The first stage 
would be to improve the quality of education provided in public school as most of member 
from designated groups cannot afford private schools. The government must also make sure 
that resources (such as libraries, laboratories and more) are made available to public schools 
and try manage poor management at those public institutions. The university intake example 
used in chapter one which shows nationally in 2007, 62.6 per cent of all students (476 770) in 
the public higher education system were Black African, 23.7 per cent (180 461) were White, 
6.9 per cent (52 596) were Indian/Asian, and 6.4 per cent (49 066) were Coloured has to 
improve if we are to achieve the goal of equality as education can be considered a key to 
success.  
This research supports the fees must fall campaign as it can be taken as a bigger picture of how 
people (especially the people from designated groups) feel about the conditions and the status 
co. The questionable report239 on fees must fall suggest that free tertiary education is not 
possible, if so, it is submitted that the government must ensure that bursaries are provided to 
the members of designated groups and further ensure that low interest rate loans are made 
available. 
Skills Development 
Education alone is not enough to put persons from designated group at the same level as those 
who have been enjoying exclusively the privileges of our resources. Skills development is 
needed. This refers to the processes of learnership.  According to the Labour Department, 
statistics by the Commission Employment Equity Annual Report240 show that Africans are only 
estimated to be at approximately 16.8%, Coloured 5.6, Indians 7.1 and Whites at 34.5.6% at 
skills development rate. This means white people have the highest proportions of people 
recruited as statistics shows that they are standing at 42.6 at management level.241  To achieve 
the goal of capacitating people I recommend that the government must take measures to ensure 
that skill development opportunities are made available to persons from designated groups. 
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Education and skills development is the key to enable people from designated groups to enjoy 
fully their rights and freedoms guaranteed in section 9 of the Constitution.  
Employment Opportunities 
Once people have been capacitated, have obtained their tertiary qualifications and have their 
skills developed employment opportunities need to be created. Job creation is also an effective 
way to improve representivity. It is submitted that state policies be directed towards job 
creation as this would enable affirmative action to play its role and achieve its objectives. 
Education and skills development would be useless if employment opportunities are not 
created. 
This dissertation has attempted to expose the true interpretation of affirmative action which 
brings about a situation where, as required by the legislation and policies, and the Constitution, 
equal opportunities are made available to all and at the same time have no sense of oppression 
directed towards white minorities. Firstly, in chapter one the research set out the topic and 
moved on to discussions which the research intended to achieve Moreover, the methodology 
used to compile this dissertation was also provided for in this chapter. The chapter was 
concluded by setting out the purpose and the background of this study. 
The second chapter defined affirmative action. It moved on to discussing affirmative action in 
South African context. A further discussion on the notion of equality and the South African 
approach was discussed and this chapter was concluded by setting out the legislative 
requirement for equal employment opportunities. The third chapter looked at how the racial 
nature of affirmative action can be managed whilst meeting the requirement for equal 
employment opportunities for all and discussed arguments for and against affirmative action. 
The aim of this chapter was to examine the question of whether the tension between inclusivity 
and equal opportunity be bridged in our interpretation of affirmative action. 
The fourth chapter observed the current legal position regarding affirmative action and how it 
was applied in South Africa. This chapter used the South African Police Service v Solidarity 
obo Barnard and Solidarity and Others v Department of Correctional Services and Others to 
achieve observe the current situation. Other current and relevant cases were looked at. The 
Barnard’s case was used in this analysis because of its status of being the current leading case 
in issues involving the application of affirmative action. The final chapter contained the 
conclusion to the dissertation. This chapter answered the question of: How South Africa can 
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continue with affirmative action that is not inclusive but at the same time still believing in equal 
opportunity for all. Lastly the chapter provided recommendations. 
“Transformation is a process.  There are profound difficulties that will be confronted in 
giving effect to the constitutional commitment of achieving equality.  We must not 
underestimate them.  The measures that bring about transformation will inevitably 
affect some members of the society adversely, particularly those coming from the 
previously advantaged communities.  It may well be that other considerations may have 
to yield in favour of achieving the goal we fashioned for ourselves in the 
Constitution.”242 
In essence this study has demonstrated that the beauty of our law is that it has found a way of 
addressing the problem of inequality by including those who were excluded but in the process 
appearing at though it is excluding others. If one looks closely to the facts, it is clear that some 
come from a privileged group and were protected by unjust law. It is submitted that affirmative 
action promotes precisely inclusion. The importance of our law is that it has given us a tool 
(affirmative action) to steer towards equality. For this reasons it is submitted that our 
affirmative action should be interpreted to mean achieving the goal of equality and equal 
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